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MAXIMIZING THE BENEFITS OF ESTATE PLANNING
BET-TO-DIE STRATEGIES: CLATS AND PRIVATE
ANNUITIES
Peter Melcher* and Matthew Zuengler"
INTRODUCTION
Estate planners commonly encounter clients with life
expectancies far shorter than average for someone the clients'

age. Tragic as this may be, it provides unique estate planning
opportunities. By using an appropriate bet-to-die strategy, such
a client can transfer assets to beneficiaries at a small fraction of
what the normal transfer tax cost would be. These strategies are
effective because they enable the taxpayer to greatly undervalue
transferred property interests for federal transfer tax purposes.
In this article, we will first provide a general explanation of
how life interests in property are valued for transfer tax
purposes, why the IRS is generally powerless to prevent
undervaluation in certain circumstances, and the extent to which
interests can be undervalued. Then, we will discuss the key betto-die strategies - charitable lead annuity trusts (CLATs) and
private annuity sales - explaining their basic operation, how
they produce economic benefits, and their advantages and

Peter Melcher, J.D., L.L.M., M.B.A., is a Senior Tax Consultant at Virchow
Krause & Company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Associate Editor of the Journal
of Retirement Planning and a frequent contributor to national estate and
retirement planning journals.
** Matthew C. Zuengler is a partner with the law firm of Hager, Dewick &
Zuengler, S.C., located in Green Bay, Wisconsin. He received a B.S., cum
laude, in Economics and Finance from Carroll College and a J.D. from
Marquette University Law School.
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disadvantages.'
VALUING LIFE INTERESTS IN PROPERTY-THE IRS's DILEMMA

Estate planners commonly divide property ownership between
(a) a life estate or life annuity interest and (b) a remainder
interest to allow for the transfer of one or the other to a
beneficiary. Because lifespans vary considerably, it is never
possible to value these interests precisely for transfer tax
purposes. This creates a dilemma for the IRS and the courts in
deciding how these interests should be valued. One alternative
would be to conduct a thorough examination of all the facts and
circumstances every time a taxpayer made a transfer. 2 This
might involve looking at the taxpayer's medical history,
investigating the longevity of ancestors, and obtaining an
opinion from the taxpayer's current physician. While this might
produce the most accurate valuation possible, it would place an
unreasonable burden on the IRS and the courts.3
The only alternative to this subjective and time-consuming
1. Sales of remainder interests, split purchases, and self-canceling installment notes
(SCINs) are also sometimes mentioned as bet-to-die strategies. Sales of remainder interests
and split purchases have limited application, however, because they are subject to I.R.C. §
2702 and can only be used effectively if the transaction falls within an exception to § 2702
(i.e., transactions involving persons other than close family members or transfers of a
personal residence). I.R.C. § 2702 (Westlaw through 2006 legislation). SCINs would
produce extremely favorable economic consequences if the seller died prematurely, but
using them as a bet-to-die strategy may be risky because they do not qualify for the safe
harbor provided in the I.R.C. § 7520 regulations. As explained more fully below, life
annuities can be valued by reference to standard IRS actuarial tables whenever the person
who is the measuring life has more than a fifty percent chance of surviving for more than
one year, but the regulations do not apply to self-canceling installment notes. The IRS takes
the position that in valuing SCINs it does not have to use the average life expectancy for a
person of the seller's age, but can look at the seller's health to determine his or her actual
life expectancy. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39503 (June 28, 1985), WL 373070. As a result, it
scrutinizes SCIN transactions carefully to make sure that taxpayers are not overvaluing the
note based on the likelihood that the seller will die early. The authors have firsthand
experience with this IRS policy, having received requests for medical information relating to
clients who have made sales using SCINs. While a strong argument could be made that the
administrative necessity rationale requiring the IRS to apply its standard tables to life
annuities should also apply to SCINs, we will limit our discussion to CLATs and private
annuities because the use of these techniques as bet-to-die strategies is firmly grounded in
Treasury regulations.
2. See Ithaca Trust Co. v. U.S., 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929).
3. See id.
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analysis would be to use actuarial tables based on average life
expectancies to provide a bright-line rule. 4 Annuities, life
estates, remainders, and reversions are generally valued by
reference to the tables prescribed in Internal Revenue Code
(I.R.C.) section 7520, which reflect mortality data for the
population as a whole and produce values appropriate for a
transferor with an average life expectancy. 5 If the transferor's
actual life expectancy is substantially different, however, the
transferred interests could be greatly overvalued or greatly
undervalued. This would not be a problem if there was no
selection bias in choosing the measuring lives for valuing the
transferred life estates, life annuities, and remainder interests.
Most interests would be assigned a value reasonably
approximating their true value. Some interests would be
substantially undervalued or overvalued, but the IRS would
come out about even in the long run.
Unfortunately for the IRS, however, measuring lives are not
selected at random. Some transfers of life interests favor
taxpayers with a longer-than-average life expectancy and others
favor taxpayers with a shorter-than-average life expectancy. 6
The former are sometimes referred to as bet-to-live strategies7
and the latter as bet-to-die strategies. Given a particular client's
circumstances, estate planners can recommend an appropriate
strategy to take advantage of the actuarial tables. Because bet-

4. Id.

5. I.R.C. § 7520 (Westlaw through 2006 legislation). We are referring to the
transferor here for clarity of presentation. Note that the person who is the measuring life
could be someone other than the transferor.
6. See McMurtry v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 659, 667 (1st Cir. 1953).
7. An example of a bet-to-live strategy is a charitable remainder annuity trust
(CRAT). To illustrate how it can be used to create transfer tax benefits, suppose that
taxpayer (T) (age sixty and in excellent health) transfers property worth $1,000,000 to a
CRAT. The CRAT is to pay T an annuity of $60,000 per year for T's life with the
remainder interest passing to charity. The actuarial life expectancy for a sixty year-old is
about twenty-one years, so on average T could expect to receive about twenty-one annuity
payments. If T lives for twenty-one years, it will turn out that the life annuity and the
charity's remainder interest were properly valued. If T lives for thirty-one years, however,
he will receive ten extra payments. This means that T's lead interest will turn out to have
been undervalued and the charity's remainder interest overvalued, basically giving T a
charitable deduction for value that T ended up retaining.
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to-die strategies now offer much greater planning opportunities,
they will be our focus in this article.
A simple example can be used to introduce the concept of
bet-to-die strategies. Suppose that a taxpayer has an actuarial
life expectancy of about twenty-five years, but has a medical
condition that reduces her actual life expectancy to only four
years. The taxpayer transfers assets worth $1,000,000 to her
children in exchange for a life annuity having the same
$1,000,000 value. Suppose further that, using the standard IRS
mortality tables and interest rate assumptions, the amount of the
annual payments is $80,000 per year. If the taxpayer lives to her
actuarial life expectancy, the value of the property transferred
and the present value of the annuity stream will be about equal.
If she lives for only four years after making the transfer,
however, she will transfer $1,000,000 and take back only
$320,000, removing $680,000 from her estate on a tax-free basis.8
Estate planners can select which taxpayers will use private
annuity sales, recommending it to individuals like this taxpayer
but not to others who may have an actual life expectancy of
twenty-five, thirty or thirty-five years. This leaves the courts
and the IRS with a difficult problem. How can the need for
administrative convenience be reconciled with the need to
prevent massive tax avoidance?
THE RESPONSE OF THE COURTS

Long ago the courts recognized that the general use of
actuarial tables to value most life estates, life annuities, and
remainder interests was an administrative necessity.9 The
alternative, a comprehensive analysis of the health of the
transferor, was generally rejected as unworkable.10 Thus, the
public policy in favor of administrative convenience generally
8. This simple example is meant only to introduce the concept of bet-to-die strategies.
We will present a more complete explanation of the tax savings when we consider the
various strategies in detail below, taking into account present value concepts and methods of
increasing the transfer tax savings.
9. Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 155; Simpson v. U.S., 252 U.S. 547, 550-51 (1920).
10. Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 155.
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came to outweigh concerns about taxpayers with shorter-thanaverage life expectancies taking advantage of the tables. Using
the tables was necessary even if it occasionally produced
inaccurate valuations."
At the same time, the courts realized that taxpayers could
go too far, and that use of the tables was improper in extreme
cases. 1 2 Thus, the issue for the courts was how short a person's
actual life expectancy had to be to justify departing from the
tables and using the actual life expectancy instead.1 '
Historically, the courts permitted the tables to be disregarded
only if actual life expectancy was brief 4 and death was "imminent

or predictable"'5 or if it was "unmistakable to one in possession of the
facts that the [individual's] life would be radically shorter than
predicted in the actuarial tables . . . ."16
In quantifying this
standard, most courts held that actual life expectancy had to be
one year or less.17 In some earlier cases, the Tax Court applied
an even more stringent standard, requiring that it be reasonably
certain that the person in question would not live for more than
one year. 8
Ultimately, the case law was codified into I.R.C. section
7520 regulations in 1989. These regulations apply to life estates,
interests for a term of years, annuities, and remainder interests. 9
They provide that the IRS must use the tables prescribed under
section 7520 unless the transferor has an "incurable illness or
other deteriorating physical condition," resulting in a fifty

11. Bank of California v. U.S., 672 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1982); Continental Illinois
Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. U.S., 504 F.2d 586, 594 (7th Cir. 1974); McMurtry, 203
F.2d at 667.
12. Bank of California,672 F.2d at 759-60; ContinentalIllinois Bank, 504 F.2d at 592-

93; Estate of Lion, 438 F.2d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1971).
13. Id.
14. ContinentalIllinois Bank, 504 F.2d at 590.
15. Estate of Fabric, 83 T.C. 932, 943 (1984) (emphasis added).
16. Estate ofLion, 438 F.2d at 62 (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., Bank of Calfornia, 672 F.2d at 760; Estate of Fabric, 83 T.C. at 942

(both stating that this was the rule in the majority of cases).
18. Estate of Butler, 18 T.C. 914, 919 (1952); Estate of Jennings, 10 T.C. 323, 327-328
(1948).
19. Treas. Reg. § 25.7520-2(a)(1) (2005).
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percent or greater chance of dying within one year. 20 The
regulations go on to provide that if the person lives for at least
eighteen months after the transfer it creates a rebuttable
presumption that the fifty percent test was satisfied. 21 The
presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence. 22 This means that bet-to-die strategies involving
interests covered under the section 7520 regulations can be
extremely favorable when the person who is the measuring life
is likely to live for more than eighteen months, but will likely die
well before reaching his actuarial life expectancy. 23 An ideal
candidate might be someone who is relatively young, say fifty,
with an illness that is likely to shorten his actual life expectancy
to perhaps three or four years. Care should be taken to
document that, as of the transfer date, the taxpayer had more
than a fifty percent chance of surviving for more than one year.
A statement by the taxpayer's long-time physician to this effect
would carry substantial weight. If the taxpayer survived for
more than eighteen months, the IRS would have a very difficult
time overcoming the presumption. 24
Recognizing the possibility of taking advantage of the tables
for certain clients, how does an estate planner determine which
strategy to use, and how can the benefits of using that strategy
be maximized? We will now address the two techniques in
detail. 25

20. Treas. Reg. §25.7520-3(b)(3) (2005).
21. Id.

22. Id.
23. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.7520-2(a)(1), 3(b)(3) (2005).
24. See Gregory A. Hayes & Edward F. Krzanowski, When IRS Actuarial Tables Don't

Apply in Valuing Interests, 32 EST. PLAN. 21, 26 (2005) (discussing when the IRS actuarial
tables need not be applied).
25. See T. R. Harris, Even the Blackest Cloud has a Silver Lining: Wealth Transfer
Planningfor the Terminally Ill Client, 1998 University of Miami Heckerling Institute on

Estate Planning at Chapter 6 (discussing the use of CLATs, private annuities, and sales of a
remainder interest as bet-to-die strategies as well as other planning considerations for clients
with a terminal illness; citing Treas. Regs. §§ 1.7520-3(b)(3), 20.7520-3(b)(3), and 25.75203(b)(3)).
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CHARITABLE LEAD ANNUITY TRUST

When used as a bet-to-die strategy, a CLAT is a split-interest
trust that pays an annuity interest to charity for the life of the
donor or some other person, with the remainder interest passing
to the donor's heirs after his or her death. 26
BASIC TAX CONSEQUENCES

TRANSFER TAXES

Assuming that the trust is a qualified CLAT, the donor
receives a gift tax charitable deduction for the present value of
the lead interest, while the present value of the remainder
interest is a taxable gift.27 The value of the remainder interest,
for gift tax purposes, is the value of the property transferred to
the trust minus the value of the charity's lead annuity interest.28
The value of the lead interest is calculated by multiplying the
amount of the annual payments by the annuity factor that
corresponds to the applicable I.R.C. section 7520 rate and the
term of the annuity. 29 These annuity factors may be found in IRS
publication 1457 or calculated from Table S, found in the
regulations under I.R.C. section 2031.30 As a practical matter,
estate planners ordinarily calculate the value of the lead and
remainder interests using commercially available software

26. Although the lead interest could also be set for a term of years, this would not
produce special economic benefits if the donor died prematurely, because the payments
would continue to the charity for the rest of the CLAT's stated term.
27. I.R.C. § 2522(c)(2)(B) (Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
28. Id.; see Treas. Reg. §25.2512-5(d)(2)(i) (2005).
29. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(d)(2)(iv)(A) (2005).
30. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(7) (Westlaw thorugh 2005 legislation). Although Table
S does not provide annuity factors directly, they can be calculated by subtracting the
appropriate remainder factor shown in Table S from one and dividing by the applicable
I.R.C. § 7520 rate. To illustrate, suppose that a fifty-five-year-old taxpayer transfers
$1,000,000 to a CLAT at a time when the I.R.C. § 7520 rate is five percent. Under these
facts, Table S shows a remainder factor of 0.34413. The corresponding annuity factor is [(10.34413)/0.05] or 13.1173. See id.
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programs.31
In the case of a term CLAT, the lead interest can be set equal
to the full value of the property transferred to the trust, reducing
the amount of the taxable gift to zero. 32 It is not possible to zero
out a life CLAT, however, because the regulations issued under
I.R.C. section 7520 permit the donor to value the charity's
annuity payments only up to the time the trust assets would be
expected to run out, given the annuity payout rate and assuming
that the trust assets produced a total return equal to the I.R.C.
section 7520 rate.33
Provided that the transfer to a CLAT is a completed gift, all
of the transfer tax consequences are ordinarily determined at the
time the CLAT is created.34 This means that there are ordinarily
no estate tax consequences when the donor dies.35
INCOME TAX

GRANTOR CLAT

If a settlor transfers property to a trust and retains one or
more of the powers, including administrative powers, the power
to revoke, and the power to control beneficial enjoyment, 36 she
will be treated as the owner of the trust for federal income tax
purposes.37 Care must be taken in deciding which powers to
retain, however, because most of the listed powers will also
cause the transferred assets to be included in the settlor's estate
at death under I.R.C. section 2036(a) or 2038.38 The most
31. Examples of available software include Tiger Tables, offered by Lawrence
Katzenstein of the Thompson Coburn law firm in St. Louis, Missouri, and Number
Cruncher, a product of Leimberg Associates, Inc. of Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania.
32. Treas. Reg. § 25.2522(c)-3(d)(2), Ex. 1 (2005).
33. Treas. Reg. § 25.7520-3(b)(2)(i).
34. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2501-1, 25.2511-2(b) (2005).
35. But see I.R.C. § 2035(b) (Westlaw through 2006 legislation) (If the donor does not
survive for more than three years after making the transfer, his or her gross estate is
increased by the amount of gift tax paid when the CLAT was created.).
36. I.R.C. § 673-77 (Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
37. I.R.C. § 671 (Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
38. I.R.C. §§ 2036(a), 2038 (Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
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frequently used power to create grantor trust status for income
tax purposes, without causing estate inclusion, is a power to
reacquire trust corpus by substituting other property of equal
value.3 9 Another popular retained power is a power to borrow
trust corpus or income without adequate interest or security. 40
In a grantor CLAT, the transferor receives an income tax
deduction for the full present value of the lead interest at the
time the trust is created, subject to limitations based on adjusted
gross income, the type of property contributed, and the type of
charity.4 1 The transferor is treated as the owner of the trust for
income tax purposes, though, and will be taxed on all of the
trust's income each year during the term of the trust ,despite the
fact that she will receive no distributions. 42
NON-GRANTOR CLAT
If the grantor retains none of the power discussed in the
previous section, the grantor is not responsible for the trust's tax
liability. In a non-grantor CLAT, the donor receives no income
tax deduction either at the time the property is contributed or at
the time the CLAT makes its annuity payments to charity.43 In a
non-grantor CLAT, the transferor is not responsible for the
trust's tax liability. The trust is subject to tax on all ordinary
income and capital gains, but it receives a charitable deduction
for the annuity payments it makes to charity from its gross
income.44 Thus, in effect, the CLAT is taxable only on income in
excess of the charitable annuity amount.
39. I.R.C. § 675(4)(C) (Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
40. I.R.C. § 675(2) (Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
41. I.R.C. § 170(f)(2)(B) (Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
42. I.R.C. § 170(f)(2)(C). The two amounts do not necessarily cancel each other out,
however. The transferor receives the charitable deduction upfront while the income tax
liability does not arise until the future, creating a timing advantage. Moreover, the upfront
deduction can be applied against ordinary income taxed at rates of up to thirty-five percent,
while the income taxed in later years may be capital gains or qualifying dividends taxed at
only fifteen percent. See, e.g., Matthew Madsen, Obtaining a Better Benefit by Using a
Grantor CharitableLead Trust, 31 EST. PLAN. 579, 579 (2004) (discussing tax advantages
of a grantor CLAT).
43. I.R.C. § 170(f)(2)(B).
44. I.R.C. § 642(c) (Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
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Regardless of whether the CLAT is a grantor or non-grantor
CLAT, the remainder beneficiaries will take a carryover basis in
the trust assets upon distribution (i.e., the remainder
beneficiaries will have the same basis the transferor had in the
assets at the time they were contributed to the trust).45
TRANSFER TAX BENEFIT

If the transferor's actual life expectancy is shorter than his
or her actuarial life expectancy, the charity will receive fewer
payments from the CLAT than the tables assume. As a result,
the charitable contribution will be overvalued and the taxable
remainder interest will be undervalued. Consider the following
example.
EXAMPLE ONE

Assume the following facts:
* Taxpayer (T) transfers assets worth $1,000,000 to a CLAT;
* The applicable I.R.C. section 7520 rate is five percent;
* T is fifty-five years old as of the date of the transfer;
* The annual annuity payments are $76,235.25 and are
made at the end of each year;
* T lives for one day after receiving the fourth annual
payment;
* The applicable annuity factor is 13.1173, making the value
of the lead interest equal to $1,000,000;
* Because of the application of the I.R.C. section 7520
exhausting corpus regulations, however, the amount of
the taxable gift is $116,784;46
* The total return on the CLAT assets is equal to the I.R.C.
section 7520 rate (five percent).
45. I.R.C. § 1015(b) (Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
46. See Treas. Reg. § 25-7520-3(b)(2)(i) (providing that payments can only be valued
until such time as the trust assets would run out given the amount of the annual payments
and assuming that the trust assets produce a total return equal to the I.R.C. § 7520 rate).
This computation is illustrated below in the section addressing back-loading payments.
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The chart below shows the operation of the CLAT during the
four-year period:

Year

Beginning

+ 5% Growth

- Annuity

Remainder

Payment

Principal

1

$1,000,000

$1,050,000

$76,235

$973,765

2
3
4

$973,765
$946,218
$917,294

$1,022,453
$993,529
$963,159

$76,235
$76,235
$76,235

$946,218
$917,294
$886,923

The amount left in the CLAT at T's death would pass to the
remainder beneficiaries with no further tax consequences. Thus,
under this scenario, T is able to transfer assets with a value of
$886,923 to his children at a transfer tax cost of only $116,784.47
Assuming a marginal estate tax rate of forty-five percent, the tax
payable on the transfer would be only $52,553 (.45 x $116,784). 48
The effective gift tax rate would be only about 5.93 percent
($52,553/$886,923).49
POSSIBLE ENHANCEMENTS

There are several potential methods of enhancing the
benefits described above:
1. transferring assets that qualify for valuation discounts;
2. transferring assets expected to produce a high total
return;
3. using a person with a more favorable life expectancy as
the measuring life;
47. If the transferor had sufficient applicable exclusion amount remaining there would
be no current gift tax payable, but the $116,784 would be included in the transferor's estate
as an adjusted taxable gift. I.R.C. § 2001(b)(1) (Westlaw through 2006 legislation); I.R.S.,
UNITED STATES ESTATE (AND GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER) TAX RETURN, Form No.
706 (2005) availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f706.pdf.
48. If T had sufficient applicable exclusion left there would be no tax payable, but
when T died his estate would include a $116,784 adjusted taxable gift.
49. We selected four years as the actual remaining lifespan of the donor to demonstrate
how dramatic the tax savings could be. While the benefit would diminish as actual
remaining lifespan increased, substantial savings would continue to be possible so long as it
was significantly less than the remaining lifespan assumed by the IRS in its mortality tables.
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4. back-loading payments; and
5. selling to a grantor trust.
DISCOUNTEDASSETS

It is well established in case law that minority interest and
lack of marketability discounts may be applied in appropriate
circumstances.50 The assets for which discounts have been
permitted include limited partnership interests and fractional
interests in real estate." If discounted assets are transferred to
the CLAT, the amount of the taxable gift and the amount of the
annuity payments will be reduced to reflect the discounted
value. Assuming that the CLAT produces sufficient income so
that payments do not have to be made in kind, the effect of
reducing the amount of the annuity payments will be to leave
more in the CLAT for the heirs when the donor dies.52
EXAMPLE TWO
Assume the same facts as in Example One, except that a
thirty percent discount can be taken on the assets transferred to
the CLAT. This reduces the amount of the taxable transfer to
$700,000, the amount of the annual payments to $53,365 ($76,235
x 0.7), and the taxable gift to $81,758 ($116,784 x 0.7). As a
practical matter, however, the value of the assets to the
beneficiaries is still $1,000,000.
This is because after the
transferor dies, the beneficiaries could be taken out of the
partnership wrapper in the case of a family limited partnership
or be recombined in the case of fractional interests, thereby

50. See, e.g., Estate of Bonner, 84 F.3d 196, 197-99 (5th Cir. 1996); McCord v.
Comm'r, 120 T.C. 358, 376-95 (2003); Estate of Jones, 116 T.C. 121, 131-41 (2001);
Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506, 517-19 (2000).
51. Id.
52. If the CLAT is forced to use discounted assets to make the annuity payments, the
benefit of the discounts will be lost. This is because the same discount percentage that was
applied to the assets when they were contributed to the CLAT would have to be applied to
the assets when they were distributed..
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restoring the value of the assets to the undiscounted amount. 3
Again, assuming that cash is used to make the annuity
payments, the value left in the CLAT to pass to the heirs at T's
death would be calculated as follows:
Year

Beginning

+ 5% Growth

Principal

- Annuity

Remainder

Payment

1

$1,000,000

$1,050,000

$53,365

$996,635

2

$996,635

$1,046,466

$53,365

$993,101

3

$993,101

$1,042,756

$53,365

$989,391

4

$989,391

$1,038,819

$53,365

$985,495

The discount not only reduces the amount of the taxable
gift, but also increases the amount left in the CLAT. The taxable
gift decreases from $116,784 to $81,758 making the amount of
gift tax payable $36,791 (.45 x $81,758). Meanwhile, the amount
remaining in the CLAT to pass to the children increases from
$886,923 to $985,495.4 The overall effect is to reduce the
effective gift tax rate on the transfer to about 3.73%
($36,791/$985,495).55
FAST-APPRECIATING ASSETS

The faster the CLAT assets appreciate, the greater the value
left in the CLAT to pass to the heirs when the transferor dies.
This means that a taxpayer can increase the amount of the taxfree transfer by selecting fast-appreciating assets to fund the
CLAT.

53. Valuation discounts for minority or fractional interests are sometimes criticized
because they typically effect only a temporary reduction in value. Eventually, the divided
interests will be put back together and the full potential value of the assets will be realized
by the family.
54. This difference is due entirely to the reduced amount of the annuity payments. It is
the annual reductions appreciated at five percent to the date of the donor's death.
55, Note that if assets must be distributed in kind, the benefit of the discount would be
lost. The same thirty percent discount would have to be applied to the assets so that a
distribution of $53,368 worth of discounted assets would have the same value as a
distribution of $76,235 of undiscounted assets, leaving the donor in the same position he
would have been in if no discounts had been available.
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EXAMPLE THREE

Assume the same facts as in Example Two, except that the
trust assets now appreciate at twelve percent instead of five
percent. Compare the amount remaining in the CLAT with the
amount remaining in the previous example.
Year
1
2
3
4

Beginning
Principal
$1,000,000
$1,066,635
$1,141,266
$1,224,852

The effective gift
($36,791/$1,318,470).

+ 5% Growth
$1,120,000
$1,194,631
$1,278,218
$1,371,834
tax

rate

is

- Annuity
Payment
$53,365
$53,365
$53,365
$53,365
now

only

Remainder
$1,066,635
$1,141,266
$1,224,852
$1,318,470
about

2.79%

USING A GRANTOR TRUST

As explained above, a CLAT can be structured as a grantor
trust causing the transferor to be taxed on the trust income. On
the surface, at least, structuring the CLAT in this way would
appear to improve its performance. The income tax payments
made by the grantor are, in effect, tax-free transfers to the trust
that permit its assets to grow at their pre-tax rate rather than at
their after-tax rate. 56 This leaves more in the CLAT to pass to the
remainder beneficiaries at the donor's death.
EXAMPLE FOUR
Assume the same facts as in Example Three, except that the
donor pays the trust's income tax, that the trust's pre-tax total
return is fifteen percent, and that the trust's effective tax rate is
twenty percent. The effect of the tax payments by the grantor is
56. Suppose, for example, that the CLAT holds assets worth $100,000 and they
produce $10,000 of taxable income. Suppose further that the average tax rate on the CLAT
income is twenty percent. If the CLAT pays its own income tax, its assets will grow at eight
percent per year. If the grantor pays the tax, however, the assets will grow at ten percent.
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that the CLAT assets now grow at fifteen percent instead of
twelve percent as shown below.
Year
1
2
3
4
The

Beginning
Principal
$1,000,000
$1,143,000
$1,306,050
$1,491,878
effective

+ 15% Growth
$1,150,000
$1,314,450
$1,501,958
$1,715,660
gift tax

rate

is

- Annuity
Payment
$7,000
$8,400
$10,080
$12,096
now

only

Remainder
$1,143,000
$1,306,050
$1,491,878
$1,703,564
about

2.16%

($36,791/$1,703,564).
A non-grantor CLAT reduces the effective gift tax rate in the
same way, however. Provided that the trust's taxable income
does not exceed its annual payments to charity, the deduction
that the CLAT receives for making these payments will reduce
its taxable income to zero, permitting the CLAT assets to grow at
their pre-tax rate of return just like the assets in a grantor CLAT.
Although the transfer tax benefits are thus equalized, grantor
trust status is still more favorable in most cases, though, because
it generally produces better income tax consequences. As
explained above, when a taxpayer makes a transfer to a CLAT,
she receives an income tax deduction upfront but must pay tax
each year on the CLAT's income.57 Although these amounts are
sometimes assumed to cancel each other out, the deduction will
generally exceed the present value of the donor's future tax
payments. The transferor receives the charitable deduction
upfront while the income tax liability does not arise until the
future, creating a timing advantage. Moreover, the upfront
deduction can be applied against ordinary income taxed at rates
of up to thirty-five percent, while the income taxed in later years
may be capital gains or qualifying dividends taxed at only
fifteen percent.5 8

57. I.R.C. § 170(f)(2)(B).
58. See Madsen, supra note 42, at 579.
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The income tax advantage may be particularly important
where the CLAT is used as a bet-to-die strategy because the
donor will receive an income tax deduction for the present value
of the lead interest. This is based on the assumption that the
transferor will live to her actuarial life expectancy but make only
a few income tax payments before dying. In the case of a
grantor CLAT for a term of years, the early death of the donor
provides no income tax advantage because any difference
between the amount of the deduction and the value of the
income tax payments made by the donor is recaptured as
ordinary income." Treasury regulations section 1.170A-6(d)(2)
provides that if a grantor CLAT ceases to be a grantor trust
before the end of its stated term (e.g., because the grantor dies),
the transferor has taxable income as of that date equal to the
amount of the income tax charitable deduction taken, minus the
amount that would have been allowed as a deduction if the term
of the charity's annuity interest had been the length of time the
lead interest actually lasted. 60 In the case of a life CLAT,
however, it would be impossible for the transferor to die before
the end of the stated term because, by definition, the trust lasts
until the transferor's death. Thus, although there appear to be
no cases or rulings directly on point, a plausible argument could
be made that there should be no recapture at the death of the
transferor. If so, the taxpayer in our examples would receive an
income tax deduction valued on the assumption that charity
would receive twenty-one payments while paying tax on only
four.
BACK-LOADING

Up to this point, we have assumed that annuity payments
were the same each year. If payments can be back-loaded so
that they start small and increase over the term of the annuity, it
would substantially improve the performance of a bet-to-die

59. I.R.C. § 170(f)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-6(c)(4) (2005).
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-6(d)(2) (2005).
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CLAT. Payments in the early years could be set much lower
than they would be if level payments were made. Although the
payments toward the end of the taxpayer's life expectancy
would be correspondingly higher, the charity would never
receive these later payments because the term of the trust would
have ended before they were due.
The applicable Treasury regulations appear to permit backloading of CLAT payments. The key provisions are as follows:
1. A "guaranteedannuity interest" qualifies for a charitable
deduction. 61
2. A guaranteed annuity interest is "an arrangementunder
which a determinable amount is paid periodically, but not less
than annually,for a specified term of years orfor the life or
lives of certain individuals, each of whom is alive on the date of
the gift and can be ascertainedat such date."6 2
3. An amount is determinable if "the exact amount which
must be paid under the conditions specified in the instrument
can be ascertainedas of the date of the gift."a
A back-loaded bet-to-die CLAT would appear to fall within
this definition. Payments would be made periodically for the
life of a specified individual who would be alive on the date the
CLAT was created and whose identity could be ascertained as of
that date. Moreover, the present value of any payment stream
could be determined as of the time the gift was made so long as
the amount of each payment was fixed. The payments would
first be discounted back to the present value using the applicable
I.R.C. section 7520 rate. Because the donor would only receive
the payments if she was alive on the date they were due, the
present value of each payment would then have to be multiplied
by the probability that the transferor would survive long enough
to receive the payment based on IRS mortality tables.
The IRS could make three arguments against back-loading.

61. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2522(c)-3(c)(2)(vi)(a), 1.170A-6(c)(2)(i) (2005) (emphasis
added).
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Treas. Reg. § 25.2522(c)-3(c)(2)(vi)(a) (emphasis added).
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One would be that the applicable regulation states that a
determinable amount must be paid periodically, not
determinable amounts, suggesting that payments cannot vary
during the trust term." This interpretation is inconsistent with
I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 9112009, however, which approved a
CLAT having annuity payments that varied from one year to the
next.65 Further, back-loading is clearly permissible in a grantor
retained annuity trust (GRAT).6 6 GRAT payments can increase
by twenty percent from one year to the next, suggesting that
there is no general prohibition in the tax law on increasing
payout annuities. 7 A second argument would be that a
payment could be so small as to be de minimis, violating the
periodic payment requirement. 68 This argument could be
addressed by setting payments high enough to have some
substance. Finally, actuaries commonly think of annuities as
payment streams having equal payments each year or payments
that change each year based on a formula. 69 This limited concept
of an annuity does not appear to have been applied in the tax
law, however. 70
While back-loading appears to have considerable support,
there may, nevertheless, be some risk. Given the powerful tax
benefits explained below, the IRS could be expected to look for
ways to prevent taxpayers from using it.
The first step in calculating the tax benefit of back-loading is
64. Contra I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-12-009 (Mar. 22, 1991).
65. Id (permitting payments to vary without even inquiring into the amount of the
variation, suggesting that there is no limit on the amount of the annual increases assuming,
perhaps, that none of the payments were so small that they lacked substance).
66. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2005).
67. Id.

68. Deborah V. Dunn & Katherine M. Cunningham, Advantages to Back-Loading: An
Analysis of Back-Loaded Annuity Payments

from

a CLAT or RPM Annuity Trust, 28 TAX

MGMT., EST., GIFTs & TR. J., 263, 263 (2004).
69. Contra I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-12-009 (Mar. 22, 1991); Dunn & Cunningham,
supra note 66, at 264-65.

70. Cf Dunn & Cunningham, supra note 66, at 264-65 (suggesting that an annuity
paying $10,000 per year for nine years with a very large final payment in year ten should
qualify as a guaranteed annuity interest); see also Peter Melcher et al., Splitting Assets
Between Family and Charities at Death: Using CLATs to Improve the Opportunity Set, 4 J.

PRAC. EST. PLAN. 35, 41-42 (Feb./Mar. 2002).
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to determine the amount of the taxable gift. Recall that
payments in a life CLAT can be valued only until the time the
CLAT assets would run out under the exhausting corpus rule.
The value of the lead interest in such a CLAT would be the sum
of the present values of all the payments that could be made
from the CLAT up to that time.
EXAMPLE FIvE

Assume these facts:
* Taxpayer (T) transfers assets worth $1,000,000 to a CLAT;
* The applicable IRC section 7520 rate is five percent;
* T is seventy years old as of the date of the transfer;
* The CLAT assets grow at five percent per year.
If the payments are not back-loaded, and the value of the
annuity stream is set equal to the value of the transferred assets,
there would be a taxable gift of $183,445.97 and gift tax payable
of $82,551. The operation of the CLAT would look like this:
Year
1
2
3
4

Beginning
Principal
$1,000,000
$940,530
$877,987
$812,416

+ 5%Growth
$1,050,000
$987,557
$921,886
$853,037

- Annuity
Payment
$109,470
$109,470
$109,470
$109,470

Remainder
$940,530
$877,987
$812,416
$743,567

Thus, the effective gift tax rate would be about 11.10%.
Compare this result with the example below in which the
annuity payments are back-loaded.
EXAMPLE SIX
Assume the same facts as in Example Five, except that the

payments now increase by

twenty percent each year.7'

71. We have selected twenty percent increases because that is the maximum increase
permitted for GRATs. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(ii)(B).
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Appendix A shows how the value of the annuity stream from
the CLAT would be calculated under the exhausting corpus rule.
Appendix A also shows that back-loading reduces the
amount of the taxable gift from $183,445.97 to $38,138.29
($1,000,000 - $961,861.71)72 and reduces the gift tax payable to
$17,158 (0.45 x $38,138.29). The amount left in the trust at the
transferor's death would also be increased as shown in the next
chart.
Remainder

$1,050,000

- Annuity
Payment
$14,626

$1,035,374
$1,069,591

$1,087,143
$1,123,071

$17,551
$21,062

$1,069,591
$1,102,009

$1,102,009

$1,157,110

$25,274

$1,131,836

+ 5% Growth

1

Beginning
Principal
$1,000,000

2
3
4

Year

$1,035,374

The $1,131,836 that passes to the remaindermen in the backloaded CLAT represents a large improvement over the $743,567
that passed to the remaindermen in the level payment scenario.
When we put together the reduced taxable gift with this
increased transfer to the remaindermen, the effective gift tax rate
drops from 11.10 percent to only about 1.52 percent! If we
added in the other enhancements, like discounted assets, the
effective gift tax rate amount would be even less.

SELECTING A MEASURING LIFE OTHER THAN THAT OF THE DONOR

Although life CLATs ordinarily use the donor as the
measuring life, the regulations historically permitted the trust
term to be based on the life or lives of other individuals
provided that each such individual was living on the date of the
gift and could be ascertained as of that date.73 This suggests that
72. The reason for the reduced taxable gift is that back-loading lengthens the period
before the trust assets do not run out until year nineteen. In the level payment scenario, the
assets run out in year thirteen.
73. Treas. Reg. § 25.2522(c)-3(c)(2)(vi)(a) (2005).
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even if the transferor could not take advantage of a CLAT as a
bet-to-die strategy because he had a normal life expectancy, he
could select another individual who did have a favorable actual
life expectancy to be the measuring life. 74 Unfortunately for
taxpayers, a special provision was added to I.R.C. section 7520
regulations in 2002 limiting the individuals who can be used as
the measuring life.75 The only permissible measuring lives for a
CLAT are now the transferor, the transferor's spouse, or an
individual who, with respect to all remainder beneficiaries, other
than charities, is either a lineal ancestor or a spouse of a lineal
ancestor of those beneficiaries. 76
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF USING

CLATS

Probably the most important advantage of a CLAT as a bet-todie strategy is that it qualifies for the one year/fifty-percent safe
harbor in Treasury regulations section 25.7520-3(b)(3), discussed
above.7 7 Although private annuities would also qualify, SCINs
would not.78 Another advantage is that it can be structured as a
grantor trust. As explained below, using a trust as the purchaser
in a private annuity sale may be problematic. If the transferor
desires to benefit both charity and family members, a CLAT may
be the most favorable strategy to use. Provided that the total
74. See id.

75. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(e)(2)(vi)(a) (2005).
76. Id The inclusion of this limitation in the regulations was in response to the use of
what was commonly referred to as a "Vulture CLAT" or "Ghoul CLAT." Estate planners
pushed the use of an alternative measuring life to its logical extreme by seeking out people
with the ideal life expectancy due. These individuals were often quite young (e.g., thirty
years old), but had a life expectancy of perhaps three or four years. Because they had a
greater than fifty percent chance of surviving for at least one year, the IRS valuation tables
could be used. In some cases, these unfortunate individuals were even paid for their
services. Although these CLATs were viewed as unethical by many estate planners, they
were used often enough to prompt the IRS to take action. See Randall D. Van Dolsen, New
Regulations Sanction 'Accelerated' Charitable Lead Trusts, 28 EST. PLAN. 162 (2001)
(discussing CLAT measuring life regulations).
77. Treas. Reg. § 25.7520-3(b)(3).
78. I.R.C. § 7520(a) (providing that valuation tables generally must be used to
determine the value of "any annuity, any interest for life or a term of years, or any
remainder or reversionary interest"); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39305 (holding that because a

SCIN does not fall into any of these categories, it can be valued by reference to the
taxpayer's actual life expectancy, taking into account any relevant information).
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return on the trust assets exceeds the I.R.C. section 7520 rate,
CLATs can be a more tax-efficient method of splitting wealth
between charity and heirs than outright gifts.79
There are also a number of disadvantages:
* Unlike a private annuity sale, it is not possible to
completely eliminate the taxable gift on a transfer to a life
CLAT because of Treasury regulation section 25.75203(b)(2)(i).so Back-loading can greatly reduce the amount

of the taxable gift, however, as explained in Example Six.
* Some value must pass from the family to charity.81 For
some transferors, this may not be consistent with their
objectives.
* The private foundation rules apply to a CLAT. 82
* The class of persons that can be used as measuring lives is
quite limited.83
The transferor may have greater
flexibility in the case of private annuities.8"
PRIVATE ANNUITY SALE

In the context of estate planning, a private annuity sale is a
transfer of property from a senior family member (S) to a junior
family member (B) in exchange for a promise by B to make
annuity payments to S for the rest of S's life. 5

79. See Melcher et al., supra note 70, at 39-40.
80. Treas. Reg. § 25.7520-3(b)(2)(i).
81. Note that the closer the value of the charity's interest is to this minimum amount,
the larger the taxable gift on the transfer (the amount of taxable gift is the value of property
transferred to CLAT minus the present value of the interest passing to charity).
82. I.R.C. §4947(a)(2) (Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
83. Treas. Reg. § 25.2522(c)-3(c)(2)(vi)(a).
84. There are no specific limitations on who may be used as a measuring life for a
private annuity. This issue is discussed in more detail below in the section on enhancing the
benefits of private annuities.
85. See Howard Zaritsky & Ronald Aucutt, Structuring Estate Freezes: Analysis with

Forms, Warren, Gorham & Lamont, at
annuity sales).

1 12.03 (on file with author) (discussing private
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GIFT TAX CONSEQUENCES
Assuming that the present value of the annuity stream is
equal to the value of the property transferred, there are no gift
tax consequences. 86 If the value of the property transferred
exceeds the present value of the annuity stream, however, such
excess constitutes a gift from the seller to the buyer.87
ESTATE TAX CONSEQUENCES

If property is transferred for a bona fide life annuity equal in
value to the property sold, there will be no estate tax
consequences when the transferor dies.8 If the transaction looks
more like a transfer with a retained income or equity interest,
however, I.R.C. section 2036(a)(1) may apply and cause the
transferred property to be included in the transferor's estate at
its full date of death value.89 This can be a highly unfavorable
result because it returns all post-transfer appreciation on the sale
to the transferor's gross estate.90
Where private annuity sales have been treated as transfers
with a retained life state, any of the following factors were
present: (1) annuity formalities were not observed or the
transaction otherwise lacked economic substance;91 (2) the seller
retained control over the transferred property; 92 (3) there was a
tie-in between the income produced by the transferred assets
and the amount of the annuity payments; 93 (4) the buyer did not

86. I.R.C. § 2512(b) (Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4(a) (2005).
88. The annuity interest terminates at death, and no adjusted taxable gift is included in
the gross estate because there was no taxable gift at the time of the sale. I.R.C § 2512(b).
89. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1).
90. One of the purposes of making the sale was to remove future appreciation in the
transferred assets from the gross estate, and this purpose would be frustrated.
91. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-13-001 (Mar. 31, 1995).
92. LaFargue v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 40, 52-58 (1979); Estate of Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807,
813-15 (1942); Rev. Rul. 76-491, 1976-2 C.B. 302.
93. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274, 278-81 (1958); Greene v.
U. S., 237 F.2d 848, 851-54 (7th Cir. 1956); Lazarus v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 854, 863-73
(1972); Rev. Rul. 68-183, 1968-1 C.B. 308 (1968).
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have significant assets other than the purchased property from
which to make the annuity payments; 94 or (5) the buyer was not
personally liable for making all annuity payments regardless of
the income produced by the purchased assets.95 This means that
the parties must respect the form of the transaction; the seller
must give up dominion over the property; the annuity must be
structured so that payments have no relationship to expected
income; the buyer must have significant assets in addition to the
purchased property; and the buyer must be obliged to use these
assets to make annuity payments if the income from the
purchased property proves to be insufficient. 96
INCOME TAx CONSEQUENCES
The income tax consequences of a sale for a private annuity
are provided in Revenue Ruling 69-7497 and are basically the
same as if the transferor sold the property and took back an
installment note. 98 The seller recognizes capital gain on the
excess of the sale proceeds over the seller's basis in the property
and has ordinary income for the portion of the payments that
function as a substitute for interest.99 Thus, to determine the
income tax consequences when each annuity payment is
received, it is necessary to apportion payments among (1) nontaxable return of basis; (2) capital gain; and (3) ordinary
income. 00
The first step in making this apportionment is to determine
the expected return on the annuity contract. This is the amount
of the annual payments multiplied by the life expectancy of the
transferor. The percentage of each payment that is non-taxable

94. LaFargue, 73 T.C. at 56-58; Rev. Rul. 76-491, 1976-2 C.B. 302.
95. Fidelity-PhiladelphiaTrust, 356 U.S. at 279-81; Rev. Rul. 68-183, 1986-1 C.B.
308.
96. Cf Zaritsky & Aucutt, supra note 85, at 1 12.03[4] (discussing when the IRS and
the courts have viewed a purported private annuity as a gift with a retained life estate).
97. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id

2006]1

BET-TO-DIE STRATEGIES

227

is the basis in the property over expected return. The percentage
that is capital gain is the present value of the annuity contract
minus basis and divided by the expected return. The percentage
that is ordinary income is the expected return minus the present
value of the annuity and divided by the expected return.
EXAMPLE SEVEN

Assume the following fact pattern:
* F sells property worth $1,000,000 to D in exchange for a
private annuity;
* The annual payments are $80,000 per year;
* F has a basis of $300,000 in the property;
* F has a life expectancy of twenty years.
The expected return on the contract is $1,600,000 (20 x
$80,000). Thus, each payment is divided as follows:
* 18.75 percent (300,000/$1,600,000) is return of basis.
* 43.75 percent ($1,000,000 - $300,000)/$1,600,000 is capital
gain.
* 37.5 percent ($1,600,000 - $1,000,000/$1,600,000 is ordinary
income.
Applying these percentages produces the following
characterization of each $80,000 annual payment:
* Return of basis.................................$15,000
* Capital gain...................................$35,000
* Ordinary Income..............................$30,000
If the seller dies before recovering her entire basis, the
remaining amount can be deducted on her final income tax
return.101 The buyer's income tax basis after the death of the
seller is limited to the amount actually paid for the property. 102
Finally, case law exists which states that if the buyer's obligation
is secured, the entire gain is recognized at the time of the sale

101. I.R.C. § 72(b)(3)(A) (Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
102. Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 C.B. 352.
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rather than being recognized only as payments are received.103
ECONOMIC BENEFIT

A private annuity sale by a person with a shorter-thanaverage life expectancy results in the seller receiving fewer
payments than would be expected for a person of the seller's
age. This causes the amount transferred out of the estate to
exceed the present value of the annuity stream coming back into
the estate and producing a gift tax-free transfer. This benefit is
illustrated in the next example.
EXAMPLE EIGHT

Assume the following facts:
* Seller (S)transfers assets worth $1,000,000 to Buyer (B);
* S takes back the right to receive an annuity for the rest of
S's life;
* Payments on the annuity are to be made annually at the
end of each year;
* S is fifty-five years old;
* The applicable I.R.C. section 7520 rate is five percent;
* T lives for four years and one day after making the
transfer.
The applicable annuity factor under these facts would be
13.1173,104 making the required annuity payment $76,235
($1,000,000/13.1173). If S dies four years after making the sale,
he would transfer $1,000,000 out of his gross estate while taking
back only $304,940 (4 x $76,235). To make a proper comparison
between these two amounts, however, we should compare their
future values as of the date of S's death. If we apply a five
percent growth rate (the applicable I.R.C. section 7520 rate) to all
assets, their date of death value would be $1,215,506, and the
103. Estate of Bell, 60 T.C. 469, 475-76 (1973).
104. See I.R.S., AcTUARIAL VALUE: BOOK ALEPH, Pub. No. 1457 available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/pl457.pdf.
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value of the annuity stream coming back into S's estate would be
$328,582, producing a tax-free transfer of $886,924 ($1,215,506 $328,582).105
POSSIBLE ENHANCEMENTS

If we assume that a thirty percent discount could be taken,
the value of the transferred assets would be reduced to $700,000
for federal transfer tax purposes, making the annual annuity
payments $53,365 ($700,000/13.1173). The sum of the payments
back to S would then be $213,459 (4 x $53,365) and their future
The
value as of S's date of death would be $230,010.106
discounted value of the transferred property as of this date
would be $850,854,107 but its potential value to the family after
the restrictions giving rise to the discount were removed (e.g.,
the assets were taken out of the partnership) would be
$1,215,506 ($850,854/0.7). Thus, the tax-free transfer would be
$985,496 ($1,215,506 - $230,010). This is $98,572 more than in the
previous example.
Transferring faster-appreciating assets would increase the
amount of the tax-free transfer in much the same way as it
would in a transfer to a CLAT.
EXAMPLE NINE

Assume the same facts as in Example Seven, except that the
transferred assets appreciate at twelve percent instead of five
Assuming that the seller invested the annuity
percent.
payments at the same five percent rate as in the previous
105. Using the § 7250 rate as the discount rate provides a fairly conservative estimate of
the economic benefit produced. The higher the growth rate assumed, the more favorable the
results. Note that it does not make sense to talk about the effective gift tax rate in the case
of a private annuity as we did in analyzing CLATs because a properly structured private
annuity produces no taxable gift. The benefit of a private annuity is that the excess of the
value transferred out of the estate over the value of the property coming back into the estate
avoids transfer tax.
106. We are again assuming that the I.R.C. § 7520 rate (five percent) is the proper
discount rate for appreciating the value of the assets.
107. $700,000 appreciated for four years at five percent.
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example, the date of death value of the annuity stream would be
the same $328,582, but the date of death value of the transferred
property would now be $1,575,519, increasing the tax-free
transfer to $1,246,937.10s
MORE FAVORABLE MEASURING LIFE

As explained above, only a limited group of persons can be
the measuring life for a CLAT.1" There are no comparable
regulations for private annuities. Thus, it appears to be possible
to shop for particularly favorable persons to serve as the
measuring life. If a person other than the seller is used as the
measuring life, and the seller dies before such person, the
annuity continues, and its value should be included in the
seller's gross estate.110
TRANSFER TO A TRUST

Any possible advantage of making a private annuity sale to
a trust must be weighed against two important disadvantages.
One is that it will be more difficult to reduce the amount of the
taxable gift to zero. The IRS has taken the position that when
property is sold to a trust with a limited fund available from
which payments could be made, the annuity stream can be
valued only until such time as the trust would be expected to
run out of funds, assuming that the trust assets grew at the I.R.C.
section 7520 rate."' In Revenue Ruling 77-454,112 a taxpayer, age

fifty-one, transferred $70,000 to a trust in exchange for the trust's
promise to pay the taxpayer a life annuity."' Under the IRS
actuarial tables then in use, the life annuity factor for a fifty-one108. If we assume that the seller invests the annuity payments received at twelve
percent, the future value of payment stream as of the seller's date of death is $364,352, and
the tax-free transfer is reduced to $1,211,167.
109. Treas. Reg. § 25.2522(c)-3(vi)(a).
110. See Zaritsky & Aucutt, supra note 85, at 1 12.03[5].
111. Treas. Reg. § 25.7520-3(b)(2).
112. Rev. Rul. 77-454, 1977-2 C.B. 351.
113. Id.
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year-old male was 11.1308, making the annual payment
necessary to avoid a taxable gift $6,288.86 ($70,000/11.1308), and
the trust was set up to pay this amount. 1 4 The taxpayer
reported no taxable gift on the transfer." 5 The IRS ruled,
however, that the fund had to be valued for the shorter of life or
the time the trust assets would run out, which was about
eighteen years under the facts of the case." 6 This reduced the
value of the annuity to $61,133, leaving a taxable gift of $8,867
($70,000 - $61,133).117

Transferring assets to a trust also creates a greater risk that
I.R.C. section 2036 will apply than a transfer to an individual."'
An individual would be personally liable on the note and would
have to use assets, other than income from the purchased
property, to make payments if necessary. This would make it
easier for the seller to avoid the argument that the annuity is a
retained equity interest. Taxpayers may be able to avoid
application of I.R.C. section 2036(a) on a sale to a trust, however,
by "seeding" the trust or having the trust beneficiaries
personally guarantee the annuity payments.'19
BACK - LOADING PAYMENTS

Although there appear to be no specific limitations on backloading a private annuity, the payment stream would have to
qualify as an annuity under general tax principles.12 0 The term
"annuity" is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code, but it is
generally understood to mean a sum of money paid periodically

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
See id.
Rev. Rul. 77-454, 1977-2 C.B. 351.
Id.
I.R.C. §2036.

119. See Milford B. Hatcher & Edward M. Manigault, Using Beneficiary Guarantees in

Defective GrantorTrusts, 92 J. TAX. 152 (March 2000); see also Robert S. Keebler & Peter
J. Melcher, Structuring IDGT Sales to Avoid Sections 2701, 2702 and 2036(a), 32 EST.
PLAN. 19, 19 (Oct. 2005) (discussing this issue in the context of sales to a defective grantor
trust for an installment note). The issues are much the same if the transferor takes back a
private annuity.
120. See Dunn & Cunningham, supra note 68, at 263.
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that is part interest and part return of capital. 121 The Tax Court
has defined the term as follows:
'Annuity' is a term somewhat loosely used in financial
and legal nomenclature and is perhaps incapable of
exact definition. Generally speaking, it designates a
right ... to receive fixed, periodical payments, either
for life or a number of years.
Its determining
characteristic is that the annuitant has an interest only
in the payments themselves and not in any principal
fund or source from which they may be derived. 122
A back-loaded annuity should qualify under this definition,
provided that none of the payments are so small as to be
insignificant. 12 3 Although the payments received increase over
the term of the annuity, their amounts are fixed from the
beginning, and they are paid periodically for the transferor's life.
If the transferor dies prematurely, he or she has no right to any
further payments. 124
If the transferor dies prematurely, back-loading a private
annuity reduces the amount of the annuity payments and
increases the tax-free transfer.
EXAMPLE TEN

Assume the same facts as in Example Four, except that the
annuity payments are made pursuant to a private annuity rather
than from a CLAT. The annual payments will be the same as
those shown in Example Four. Thus, the payments will be
reduced from $109,470 each year to $14,626, $17,551, $21,062 and
$25,274 in the first four years, respectively. The future value of
the assets transferred to the heirs would be $1,215,506
($1,000,000 appreciated for four years at five percent). The date
121. Conn'r v. Meyer, 139 F.2d 256, 259 (6th Cir. 1943); Bodine v. Comm'r, 103 F.2d
982, 984-85 (3rd Cir. 1939).
122. George H. Thornley, 2 T.C. 220, 233 (1943), rev'd on other issue 147 F.2d 416,
420-21 (3d Cir. 1945) (quoting Commonwealth v. Beisel, 13 A.2d 419 (Pa. 1940)).
123. See Dunn & Cunningham, supra note 68, at 263-64.
124. See Zaritsky & Aucutt, supra note 85, at 12.03[6] (agreeing that private annuities
can have an increasing payout feature and include a back-loaded private annuity form in
their treatise providing for payments that increase by twenty percent each year), Form 28
(permitting the measuring life to be someone other than the transferor).
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of death value of the amount returning to the seller in the level
payment scenario would be $471,829, producing a tax-free
transfer of $743,677 ($1,215,506 - $471,829). The date of death
value of this amount in the back-loaded scenario would be only
$83,670, producing a tax-free transfer of $1,131,836, which is
$388,159 more than with level payments.
ADVANTAGES

& DISADVANTAGES OF A PRIVATE ANNUITY SALE

ADVANTAGES

The most important advantages of using a private annuity
as a bet-to-die strategy are: (1) it clearly qualifies for the I.R.C.
section 7520 safe harbor; (2) it can be structured so there is no
taxable gift; 125 (3) any measuring life appears to be permissible;
and (4) there is no need to give anything to charity.
DISADVANTAGES

There are four key disadvantages. First, the buyer receives
no income tax deduction for the ordinary income component of
the annual payments, even though it has a function much the
same as interest. Second, the buyer's basis in the purchased
property is limited to the sum of the annuity payments actually
paid. Third, the note should be unsecured to avoid possible
estate inclusion under I.R.C. section 2036(a). 126 Fourth, if the
buyers did not have substantial assets of their own before the
sale, and the purchased property does not produce as high a
total return as the parties expected, it may be difficult for the
buyers to make the required payments. 127
125. Assuming the sale is made to an individual and not to a trust. If the sale were made
to a trust, the IRS would try to apply the exhausting corpus rule of Treasury regulation §
25.7520-3(b)(2).
126. This limits buyers to those the seller is sure he can trust.
127. See Zaritsky & Aucutt, supra note 85, at §12.03[5] (discussing the possibility that
the IRS might also attempt to apply the original issue discount (OID) rules to a back-loaded
private annuity and discussing the benefits of a back-loaded private annuity). Proposed
regulations issued in 1995 refused to extend the exclusion from the OID rules for life
annuities found in I.R.C. § 1275(a)(1)(B) to annuities with payments increasing at any time
during the term of the contract. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(d) (1995). Final regulations
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CONCLUSION

Case law and Treasury regulations require the IRS to use
standard actuarial tables to value most life annuity interests.
This creates a golden opportunity for taxpayers with shorterthan-average life expectancies to use CLATs or private annuities
to transfer tremendous amounts of wealth at a dramatically
reduced transfer tax. The benefits may exceed those available
from any other strategies for making large wealth transfers. It
may be possible to enhance these savings by transferring fastappreciating discountable assets, back-loading the annuity
payments, and/or taking advantage of grantor trust status.
Given the potential power of these strategies, the IRS can expect
to see them used more frequently in the future. Provided that all
formalities are observed, the transactions are carefully
structured, and the taxpayers do not carry them to extremes,
both strategies appear to work under the applicable case law
and Treasury regulations, even in their more advanced forms.
We should caution, however, that because of the tremendous
potential for reducing tax revenue, the IRS could be expected to
do everything it can to find ways to attack these strategies.

on this subject issued in 1997 took a different approach, however, and excluded only life
annuities in which the life contingency was not "real or signficant." Treas. Reg. § 1.12751(j)(1) (1997) (emphasis added). The regulations go on to state that an annuity had a bona
fide life contingency only if the contract has no terms or conditions that can significantly
reduce the probability that total distributions under the contract will increase
commensurately with the longevity of the annuitant. Id.
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